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Abstract—The Tor network hosts a large amount of illegal
content that needs to be categorized by cybersecurity agencies,
but this process can be slow and error-prone. For this reason,
this paper introduces a new perceptual hashing method for
automatically classifying domains by their screenshots. First we
make available DUSI-2K (Darknet Usage Service Images-2K), a
set of image data with screenshots of active Tor service domains.
We also introduce a new, robust image hashing method, called
F-DNS. To evaluate the efficiency of F-DNS, we carried out tests
using images subject to various content-preserving operations,
and comparing them with their original images, achieved bet-
ter correlation coefficients than other state-of-the-art methods,
especially in the case of rotation. In addition, we applied F-
DNS to categorize Tor domain screenshots, using the DUSI-2K
dataset. We compared its performance with Visual Word Ware
(BoVW), ResNet50, and Inception-ResNet-v2, showing that F-
DNS outperforms all of them.
Index Terms—Perceptual Hashing, Deep Web, Tor, DCT, F-
DNS, Image Classification
Type of contribution: Research already published
I. INTRODUCTION
Outside the reach of standard search engines such as
Google, Yahoo, or Bing, there is the deep web, whose content
cannot be indexed by them. Within it we find darknets that
can only be accessed by special browsers, the most famous
of them is Tor (The Onion Router), in which a large amount
of illegal content can be found. Recognizing this content is
a slow and difficult task for cybersecurity agencies, and can
affect the mental health of people exposed to such activities
who are responsible for categorizing it.
To support this task, in this paper we present DUSI-2K,
a dataset with 2500 snapshots of Tor domain home pages,
divided into 16 categories, and make this dataset available to
the public. In addition, we introduce a new perceptual hashing
method, called Frequency-Dominant Neighborhood Structure
(F-DNS), which achieves an excellent balance between per-
ceptual robustness and anti-collision capability and demon-
strates good performance against image content-preserving
operations, especially against rotations, which often signifi-
cantly reduce the effectiveness of other state-of-the-art per-
ceptual hashing methods. Finally, we applied F-DNS to the
problem of automatic domain category detection in Darknet
Tor from its screenshots and compared its performance with
other perceptual hashing methods and conventional image
classification methods.
II. DARKNET USAGE SERVICE IMAGES-2K (DUSI-2K)
One of the project’s contributions is DUSI-2K, an exten-
sion of Darknet Usage Service Images (DUSI) [1] a dataset
containing snapshots of the Tor Darknet manually classified
into six categories. On the other hand, DUSI-2K has 16 Tor
domain categories selected by a semi-supervised process1
The construction of DUSI-2K began with a tracing process
using the DUTA tagged domains, a Tor domain dataset [2],
thus obtaining 2751 snapshots of active Tor domains, that
were labeled using DUTA categories.
At DUSI-2K, a distinction has been made between legal,
illegal, and undefined content based on a visual inspection
of the screenshots and a broad perspective of what might be
considered legal or not. Specifically, we consider the following
categories to be legal: Blog, Casino, Cryptography, Forum,
Hosting, White Markets, Personal, Legal Services, Chats and
Wiki. On the other hand, we consider “illegal” domains those
labeled as Cryptolocker, Drugs, Black Market and Weapons.
Finally, due to their nature, we consider the categories Down,
Empty and Locked as “undefined”.
III. FREQUENCY-DOMINANT NEIGHBORHOOD
STRUCTURE (F-DNS) PERCEPTUAL HASHING
In the pre-processing stage, the image is converted to
grayscale and then softened by a Gaussian filter to improve
detection performance and perceptual robustness. After pre-
processing the image, the features are extracted by means of
Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) and the Dominant Neigh-
borhood Structure (DNS), proposed by Khellah [3].
Firstly, DCT is applied to the pre-processed image, looking
for the energy of the texture of each pixel, then the Dominant
1http://gvis.unileon.es/dataset/dusi-darknet-usage-service-images-2k/
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Neighborhood Structure (DNS)[3] is applied to its output to
extract its features. The DNS exploits the high redundancy
found in images with repetitive patterns.
The final image hash is generated using the coefficients but
discarding the first row and column, thus, avoiding including
the DC component of the DCT, which was considered in the
calculation of the F-DNS maps. Therefore, at the end of the
process, the hash code of each image is composed of 64 real
values.
Since the DNS is extracted from the DCT of the image
instead of from the original image we name the extracted map
as Frequency-Dominant Neighborhood Structure (F-DNS).
The basic idea behind the creation of a F-DNS map is that
the texture energy similarities calculated following the process
described above should be similar when the texture energies
are redundant in local neighborhood pixels.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To evaluate the robustness of F-DNS, an internal test was
performed by randomly selecting 35 images from the USC-
SIPI dataset and generating visually identical versions of
them, applying the content-preserving operations presented
in the Table I. Subsequently, we calculated the correlation
coefficients between the hashes calculated from the attacked
images and the hash of their corresponding original image.
The coefficients obtained by F-DNS are between 0.89 and 1.
We compared the performance of F-DNS with other state-
of-the-art perceptual hashing methods, these are RP-IVD [4],
SS-Salient-SF [5] and pHash [6]. The average score of the
correlation coefficients obtained can be seen in the Table I
TABLE I
MEAN CORRELATION COEFFICIENT SCORES OF THE FOUR METHODS
EVALUATED.
Operation SS-Salient-SF RP-IVD pHash F-DNS
Brightness adjustment 0.9448 0.9583 0.9884 0.9985
Contrast adjustment 0.8942 0.9920 0.9967 0.9993
Gamma correction 0.9719 0.9957 0.9990 0.9995
Salt and pepper noise 0.9963 0.9872 0.9612 0.9999
Multiplicative noise 0.9947 0.9939 0.9754 0.9999
3× 3 Gaussian 0.9927 0.9973 0.9988 0.9999low-pass filter
JPEG compression 0.9997 0.9986 0.9979 0.9993
Scaling 0.9723 0.9773 0.9704 0.9875
Rotation 0.0438 0.2959 0.2773 0.9365
Watermark embedding 0.9989 0.9601 0.9894 0.9989
As can be seen, F-DNS performs best against most content-
preserving operations, and stands out for its performance in
rotation, where other techniques achieve low performance.
On the other hand, a second test consisted in randomly
taking 200 different images from the UCID [7] and Ground
Truth [8] databases and putting them together, generating all
the 19990 possible image pairs. The resulting distributions
of the correlation coefficients of each method can be seen in
Figure 1.
It can be seen that the minimum and maximum values of
SS-Salient-SF, RP-IVD, pHash and F-DNS were [-0,79, 0,93],
[-0,69, 0,96], [-0,93, 0,99] and [0,2, 0,97], respectively.
Considering the results of the tests performed with SS-
Salient-SF, RP-IVD, pHash and F-DNS, the best thresholds
Fig. 1. Discrimination capability test on 19,990 different image pairs.
were defined by which a two images can be considered
different or similar. The thresholds selected for each method
are T = 0.97, T = 0.96, T = 0.97 and T = 0.98
respectively, because lowering them would increase the false
positives. Thus, the percentage of false negatives obtained for
SS-Salient-SF, RP-IVD, pHash and F-DNS is 27.27%, 25%,
27.27% and 5.68% respectively, demonstrating that F-DNS
outperforms other state-of-the-art methods.
Finally, once we have demonstrated the discrimination
capacity of the proposed perceptual hashing method, F-DNS,
we have evaluated it for the task of classifying the domain
categories of the Tor Darknet by means of the captures of its
DUSI-2K dataset home pages.
Within the DUSI-2K categories we distinguished a total of
79 templates containing 1624 images, i.e. web page designs,
which were frequently used in domains with similar topics.
First, we calculated the hash codes of the 79 templates and
compared them with the hash code of each of the remaining
1545 images. The classification consisted of assigning each
test image to the template (and therefore its class) for which
the similarity was maximum.
We repeated the experiment 20 times, including the random
selection of the template of each class, and obtained an overall
accuracy of 98.75 using F-DNS.
To compare our results we performed the same procedure
with other perceptual hashing methods, i.e. RP-IVD [4], SS-
Salient-SF [5], and pHash [6], obtaining a 95.84%, 95.45%
and 89.91% respectively. In addition, since this can be consid-
ered as an image classification task, we have also evaluated
some state-of-the-art image descriptors: BoVW with dense
SIFT and features extracted through Convolutional Networks,
i.e. ResNet50 , and Inception-ResNet-v2 , using a Vector
Support Machine (SVM) for classification in all three cases,
obtaining a 31.38%, 82.07%, and 85.19% respectively. And
finally it was tested with fine-tunned ResNet50 and Inception-
ResNet-v2, and the results were 37.12 and 79.15 respectively.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have made available to the public the
DUSI-2K dataset with 2500 snapshots of Tor domains. We’ve
also proposed a new robust image hashing scheme, called F-
DNS, and used it to classify Tor domains.
We compared the performance of F-DNS with other state-
of-the-art schemes, as well as with conventional image clas-
sification models, and showed that F-DNS achieves the best
results.
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